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WHERE ARE ALL THE TRANSNATIONAL 
BANKRUPTCIES?  
THE PUZZLING CASE FOR UNIVERSALISM 
Robert K. Rasmussen* 
niversalism is on the march. For a century the goal of bringing 
some degree of harmonization to the world’s varying insolvency 
regimes seemed something of a quixotic quest. Scholars repeatedly 
touted the welfare gains that would result if the world were to move to-
ward a system that assigned a single forum the lead role in sorting the 
financial distress of insolvent debtors.1 The near-consensus in the acad-
emy had little impact on practice, however, as countries clung stubbornly 
to territorialism. Each country asserted primary jurisdiction over the as-
sets found within its borders, and would pay little heed to the work of 
other courts in countries where the debtors’ assets were located.2 The 
cries of the academic commentators went unheeded. 
The tide has seemingly turned.3 The European Union has adopted rules 
designed to deal with the financial distress of an enterprise with assets in 
various member countries.4 It requires that the jurisdiction in which the 
“centre of main interests” of the enterprise is located take the lead in 
sorting out the affairs of the troubled firm.5 The international organiza-
tion charged with proposing model commercial laws—UNCITRAL—has 
drafted a law that would provide coordination in the case of a transna-
                                                                                                             
 *  Milton Underwood Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School. I would 
like to thank Douglas Baird, Don Bernstein, Andy Kaufman, and Stephen Lubben, and as 
well as the participants at the Bankruptcy in the Global Village Symposium, the 2007 
Annual Meeting of the American Law and Economics Association, and faculty work-
shops at the Seton Hall and Toronto law schools for helpful discussions on the themes in 
this Article. 
 1. See, e.g., John Lowell, Conflict of Laws as Applied to Assignments for Creditors, 
1 HARV. L. REV. 259, 264 (1888). 
 2. See Douglas G. Boshkoff, Some Gloomy Thoughts Concerning Cross-Border 
Insolvencies, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 931 (1994). 
 3. See Ian F. Fletcher, Maintaining the Momentum: The Continuing Quest for 
Global Standards and Principles to Govern Cross-Border Insolvencies, 32 BROOK. J. 
INT’L L 767 (2007); John Pottow, The Myth (and Realities) of Forum Shopping in Trans-
national Insolvency, 32 BROOK. J. INT’L L 785 (2007) [hereinafter Pottow, Myth (and 
Realities)]. 
 4. See Council Regulation 1346/00, Insolvency Proceedings, 2000 O.J. (L160) 1 
(EC). 
 5. Id.; Case C-341/04, Eurofood IFSC Ltd., 2006 E.C.R. I-3813. 
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tional insolvency.6 The United States has recently turned the proposed 
law into positive law by adding Chapter 15 to its bankruptcy code.7 
While there are differences between the E.U. Regulation and Chapter 15 
of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (Chapter 15), they share the same core 
commitments.8 With Europe and the United States both adopting the uni-
versalist stand, its triumph now seems inevitable. 
Overlooked in the discussion over whether the universalist program is 
better than its competitors is an assumption that rests uneasily with the 
realities of modern bankruptcy practice. The aim of this Article is to ex-
pose this assumption, demonstrate how it cannot be squared with the ob-
served practices handling the financial distress of transnational enter-
prises, and suggest how, in light of the dynamics on the ground, the dis-
cussion on transnational insolvencies needs to evolve. 
The literature on transnational insolvencies assumes that multiple in-
solvency proceedings will inevitably result once a transnational enter-
prise becomes financially distressed. It is a staple of the literature that a 
business with substantial assets in more than one country will be subject 
to bankruptcy proceedings in more than one country. Creditors seeking 
to get paid will attempt to seize assets in any country they are located. 
Thus, for those who view the prior century’s commitment to territorial-
ism with alarm, globalization raises the stakes. As more and more coun-
tries have a worldwide footprint, the number of companies whose fate 
will be left to competing bankruptcy systems increases. In other words, 
the number of insolvency proceedings an insolvent company faces is 
solely a function of the number of jurisdictions in which it has substantial 
assets. The universalist concern is that when a company faces an array of 
insolvency proceedings, this raises the possibility that the multiple courts 
will not be able to work together, and the company will be forced into 
liquidation. 
If this assumption were accurate, one would expect that it would be 
easy to identify many instances where a financially distressed enterprise 
is subject to multiple insolvency proceedings. Companies increasingly 
have a global reach, and we would thus expect a surfeit of multiple pro-
ceedings. Yet the puzzle is that we see so few such cases relative to the 
                                                                                                             
 6. U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW [UNCITRAL], UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON 
CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY WITH GUIDE TO ENACTMENT art. 1, U.N. Sales No. E.99.V.3 
(1997). 
 7. 11 U.S.C. § 1501 (2006). 
 8. For a comparison of the two approaches, see Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Multina-
tional Enterprises in General Default: Chapter 15, The ALI Principles, and The EU In-
solvency Regulation, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1 (2002) [hereinafter Westbrook, Multinational 
Enterprises]. 
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number of financially distressed debtors with multinational operations. 
There are undoubtedly debtors who have bankruptcy proceedings in 
more than one country. It is not that cases that involve multiple proceed-
ings do not exist. Yet there seem to be many fewer cases than one would 
expect if one were to give full credence to the fears of those studying the 
field. The number of financially distressed transnational enterprises far 
exceeds the number of situations involving multiple insolvency proceed-
ings. 
This Article proposes an answer to this puzzle. The answer is that debt-
ors and their senior creditors control the extent to which distressed trans-
national businesses are subject to more than one bankruptcy proceeding. 
In other words, the implicit assumption is that the number of bankruptcy 
proceedings to which a debtor is subject is determined by its existing 
deployment of assets and liabilities. In fact, however, there are ways in 
which debtors and their senior creditors have the ability to determine the 
number of countries that will be involved in resolving the companies’ 
financial distress. 
The fact that the number of forums involved in the bankruptcy of a 
transnational enterprise is to a large degree within the control of the 
debtor and its senior creditors requires that we reorient our focus on 
transnational insolvencies. The risk of inefficient liquidations that moti-
vated the universalist agenda does not loom large in today’s environ-
ment. Liquidations occur only when those in charge of the debtor decide 
that the assets should be sold. In this respect, international bankruptcy 
practice is converging with American bankruptcy practice.9 In both set-
tings, the crucial question is the extent to which debtors use the discre-
tion they have to make value-maximizing decisions. Credi-
tors⎯especially senior lenders⎯have had increasing input into the cru-
cial decisions that face a financially distressed company.10 The forces 
                                                                                                             
 9. I will admit to an American bias in perspective here. I have at best a passing fa-
miliarity with the bankruptcy practices in other countries. Also, the transnational insol-
vency cases of which I am aware have a substantial connection with the United States. 
The extent to which we see a general convergence among bankruptcy regimes and the 
extent to which the handling of the affairs of a transnational debtor depends on which 
countries are involved are interesting questions that are beyond the scope of this Article. 
 10. The rise of creditor control in Chapter 11 and the reasons for it have been the 
subject of a series of Articles that I have written with Douglas Baird. See Douglas G. 
Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing Lever of Corporate Gov-
ernance, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1209 (2006) [hereinafter Baird & Rasmussen, Private Debt]; 
Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight, 56 STAN. L. REV. 673 
(2003); Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. 
REV. 751 (2002). Others have noticed this trend as well. See Stephen J. Lubben, The 
“New and Improved” Chapter 11, 93 KY. L.J. 839 (2005); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The 
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that have allowed creditors to exert greater control over the affairs of a 
troubled company in America do not stop at our national borders. The 
next generation of transnational bankruptcy scholarship should focus less 
on the relations between nations and more on the dynamics of control. 
I. GLOBAL COMPANIES AND TRANSACTIONAL INSOLVENCIES 
Three basic paradigms dominate the transnational insolvency literature. 
The first, which seems to have the greater number of adherents in the 
academy, is universalism.11 In its most utopian form, a universalist ap-
proach envisions a single set of insolvency rules applied by a single fo-
rum. Few expect to witness the emergence of such a system anytime 
soon. The more attainable universalist approach, often referred to as pro-
cedural universalism, is a system that would allow for the coordination of 
multiple bankruptcy proceedings. When a company with operations 
across the globe runs into financial distress, it will be subject to an insol-
vency proceeding in each country where it has substantial assets. The 
universalists seek a rule that identifies which country will take the lead in 
sorting out the debtor’s affairs. By and large, universalists envision that 
the country that is the “home” of the debtor will be the one which is the 
situs of the main proceeding. The role of the other countries is to imple-
ment the decisions that have been made in the main jurisdiction. Of 
course, the primary decision in any bankruptcy is the fact of the com-
pany, whether it is to be rescued or liquidated. 
Another paradigm, cooperative territorialism, takes a different path.12 
Like universalism, it recognizes that the territorial approach to transna-
tional financial distress risks inefficient liquidations. Companies that are 
worth more if kept together will be liquidated as each nation focuses 
blindly on the assets within its territorial boundaries. Yet scholars em-
                                                                                                             
Control of Wealth in Bankruptcy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 795 (2004); David A. Skeel, Jr., Credi-
tors’ Ball: The “New” New Corporate Governance in Chapter 11, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 
917 (2003) [hereinafter Skeel, Creditors’ Ball]. 
 11. Jay Westbrook has been the most tireless proponent of universalism. Of his many 
contributions, two in particular set forth his overall vision. See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, 
A Global Solution to Multinational Default, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2276 (2000) [hereinafter 
Westbrook, A Global Solution]; Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism in 
Global Insolvencies: Choice of Law and Choice of Forum, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 457 
(1991) [hereinafter Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism]. Andrew Guzman has bolstered 
the universalist case with an economic analysis of the problem. See Andrew T. Guzman, 
International Bankruptcy: In Defense of Universalism, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2177 (2000). 
 12. Lynn LoPucki is the architect of this approach. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Case 
for Cooperative Territoriality in International Bankruptcy, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2216 
(2000); Lynn M. LoPucki, Cooperation in International Bankruptcy: A Post-Universalist 
Approach, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 696 (1999). 
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bracing this approach believe that the self-interest of states means that 
they are unlikely to cede control over assets in their jurisdiction to other 
nations.13 They also worry that, for some companies, is it difficult to 
identify which country is the home country. More recently, cooperative 
territorialism scholars have raised the concern that the home jurisdiction 
is malleable enough to allow for forum shopping, which will have a per-
nicious effect on transnational bankruptcy practice.14 To avoid these ills, 
those in favor of cooperative territorialism counsel that each country 
should retain control over the assets it has, but in administering these 
assets, the affected countries should attempt to work together. Stated 
somewhat simplistically, universalism seeks cooperation through ex ante 
commitments whereas cooperative territorialism seeks cooperation on an 
ex post basis.  
A third approach would give more decision-making power to the busi-
nesses themselves. Companies would, in advance, commit to having ei-
ther one or multiple bankruptcy proceedings.15 Under this approach, an 
enterprise that believed that its value would be maximized through a sin-
gle proceeding could commit to such an action, and all states would re-
spect this choice. Conversely, companies that thought that multiple pro-
ceedings would be better for handling their insolvency could choose that 
route. This approach differs from the prior two in that it allows compa-
nies rather than legislation to determine the number of bankruptcy pro-
ceedings and the location of those proceedings. 
Underlying all of these approaches is an assumption about the relation-
ship between transnational enterprises and insolvency laws. The assump-
tion is that having assets in multiple countries inevitably leads to the 
commencement of multiple insolvency proceedings. When assets are 
spread across the world, it is inevitable that more than one country’s 
bankruptcy law will be invoked. Creditors in each country will turn to 
local assets in an attempt to satisfy their claims. These efforts will even-
tually lead to the invocation of insolvency proceedings in each country 
where the debtor has substantial assets. It is the existence of these multi-
ple proceedings that all transnational bankruptcy scholarship addresses. 
                                                                                                             
 13. See Frederick Tung, Is International Bankruptcy Possible?, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 
31 (2001); Frederick Tung, Fear of Commitment in International Bankruptcy, 53 GEO. 
WASH. INT’L L. REV. 555 (2001). 
 14. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, Universalism Unravels, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 143, 143 
(2005). For a thoughtful reply, see Pottow, Myth (and Realities), supra note 3. 
 15. I have argued for this approach in prior work. See Robert K. Rasmussen, Resolv-
ing Transnational Insolvencies Through Private Ordering, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2252 
(2000); Robert K. Rasmussen, A New Approach to Transnational Insolvencies, 19 MICH. 
J. INT’L L. 1 (1997). 
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As Jay Westbrook has noted, “a global market requires a global bank-
ruptcy law.”16 This conflict among bankruptcy laws is the territorialist 
reality that fuels the agenda of reform advocates. 
The focus in this literature tends to be on countries and creditors. Be-
cause of what John Pottow has aptly labeled “pride,” countries have a 
tendency to assert a substantial interest in the assets within their territo-
rial boundaries rather than defer to decisions made elsewhere.17 Creditors 
create the problem because their narrow self-interest leads them to file 
chase assets wherever those assets can be found. It is rapacious creditors 
starting insolvency proceedings in all jurisdictions where the debtor has 
substantial assets that form the backdrop for all discussions of transna-
tional insolvencies. 
II. THE SCARCITY OF MULTIPLE PROCEEDINGS 
The traditional account of transnational insolvencies suggests that there 
would be many businesses that are subject to multiple insolvency pro-
ceedings. Once a company has significant assets in more than one coun-
try, the actions of creditors will inevitably trigger multiple insolvency 
proceedings. Indeed, according to this story, we would expect to see an 
insolvency proceeding in every jurisdiction where the debtor had suffi-
cient assets to make it worth a creditor’s effort to invoke local debt col-
lection mechanisms. 
The empirical reality, however, appears to be quite different. Unfortu-
nately, I do not know of any thorough empirical study that provides solid 
                                                                                                             
 16. Westbrook, A Global Solution, supra note 11, at 2287; see also Guzman, supra 
note 11, at 2177 (“The growth of international business, therefore, has brought with it a 
growth in the number of international business failures.” (footnote omitted)); Westbrook, 
Multinational Enterprises, supra note 8, at 1 (“The steady expansion of international 
trade has become perhaps less significant than its consequence, the growth of multina-
tional enterprise, which in turn has lead inevitably to the increased incidence of multina-
tional financial failure.”); Jay Lawrence Westbrook & Jacob S. Zeigel, The American 
Law Institute NAFTA Insolvency Project, 23 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 7, 8 (1997) (“The para-
digm case for the Project is the bankruptcy of a company with headquarters in one of the 
NAFTA countries and with suppliers, lenders, operations, assets, employees, and stock-
holders in all three.”); Barry L. Zaretsky, Bankruptcy in the Global Village: Introduction, 
23 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1, 1 (1997) (“As cross-border economic activity has increased dra-
matically, so have questions about reconciling the various systems for dealing with busi-
ness failure.”); Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism, supra note 11, at 457 (stating that 
“the emergence of worldwide defaults” is one consequence of “[t]he surging growth of 
transnational enterprise”). 
 17. See John A. E. Pottow, Greed and Pride in International Bankruptcy: The Prob-
lems of and Proposed Solutions to “Local Interests,” 104 MICH. L. REV. 1899, 1901 
(2006) [hereinafter Pottow, Greed and Pride]. 
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data on the percentage of companies with transnational operations that 
become subject to bankruptcy proceedings in more than one country. The 
evidence that is available, however, suggests that multiple-proceeding 
cases are much less frequent than they would be if the standard account 
of transnational insolvency were accurate. In the last ten years, 1,448 
public companies filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code (Chapter 11).18 One would guess that a large number 
of these companies⎯probably a substantial majority⎯had assets in other 
countries. Yet few of these cases involved multiple proceedings. Indeed, 
it is relatively easy to identify large transnational companies that ad-
dressed their problems in a single bankruptcy forum. Below are a few 
notable examples. 
A. United Airlines 
One would think that if there was ever a worldwide company, it would 
be United Airlines (“United”). United was (and still is) one of the 
world’s largest airlines. As of 2003, it had over 1,600 daily departures to 
over 110 destinations across 23 countries.19 The company is part of a 
global network which operates flights in every corner of the world. The 
revenues that United generates reflect its international character. In 2003, 
sixty-four percent of United’s revenues came from North America, fif-
teen percent from the Pacific, thirteen percent from Europe, and three 
percent from Latin America.20 Its planes and employees circled the world 
on a constant basis. In every country it operates it needs landing slots, 
maintenance, fuel, ticket agents, and the like. Few would question that 
United has “profound effects on the dozens of nations around the globe” 
in which it operates.21 
When United encountered financial distress in 2002, however, this did 
not trigger the host of ills that the universalists fear. Creditors in the vari-
ous countries where United was operating at the time did not rush to grab 
assets to satisfy their debts. United did not face a host of conflicting and 
competing bankruptcy proceedings. Rather, United landed in a single 
bankruptcy court in the United States.22 United was a transnational 
debtor, but the bankruptcy case was domestic. 
                                                                                                             
 18. See THE 2006 BANKRUPTCY YEARBOOK & ALMANAC 31 (Kerry A. Mastroianni 
ed., 2006). 
 19. UAL Corp., UAL Corporation and Subsidiary Companies Report on Form 10-K 
for the Year Ended December 31, 2003, at 3 (2004), available at http://media.corporate-
ir.net/media_files/NYS/UAL/reports/UAL10K2003.pdf. 
 20. Id. at 7. 
 21. Pottow, Greed and Pride, supra note 17, at 1900. 
 22. In re UAL Corp., No. 02-B-48191 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2006). 
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B. Sea Containers 
Sea Containers provides another example of a case which would seem 
to present the conditions that universalists fear would lead to multiple 
proceedings. Sea Containers has $1.67 billion in assets and 8,000 em-
ployees worldwide. Its operations consist primarily of two discrete busi-
nesses: a railroad based in the United Kingdom and a joint venture with 
General Electric Co. (GE) to lease sea containers.23 This latter operation 
is one of the four largest of its type in the world.24 Sea Containers, as a 
complement to this latter business, manufactures and repairs containers 
in Charleston, South Carolina; Yorkshire, England; and Santos, Brazil.25 
The company has offices in London, Genoa, New York City, Rio de Ja-
neiro, Singapore, and Sydney.26 
While Sea Containers had substantial assets, it also had substantial 
debts. It owes more than $1.5 billion.  Thus, if one credits the asset val-
ues it reports, Sea Container is marginally solvent. However, the com-
pany could not service its debt. In particular, it could not meet a $110 
million payment on publicly issued notes that were maturing in late 
2006. To resolve its problems, Sea Containers filed a Chapter 11 bank-
ruptcy petition in Delaware.27 To date, this remains the only insolvency 
proceeding involving the company. 
C. Exide 
Exide is the world’s largest manufacturer and distributor of batteries. 
Its Web site boasts that it manufactures and distributes batteries in 
eighty-nine countries.28 In fiscal year 2001, it had worldwide sales of 
$2.4 billion.29 If one were to look at Exide in fiscal 2001, it would be 
difficult to imagine a more transnational operation. Fifty-two percent of 
the company’s sales were in Europe, forty-five percent in North Amer-
                                                                                                             
 23. See Sea Containers Ltd., Company Profile, http://www.seacontainers.com (last 
visited May 18, 2007). 
 24. See id. 
 25. Sea Containers Ltd., Containers: Factories, http://www.seacontainers.com/ 
fr_containers.asp (last visited May 18, 2007). 
 26. Sea Containers Ltd., Home Page, http://www.seacontainers.com (last visited May 
18, 2007). 
 27. In re Sea Containers Ltd., No. 06-11156 (Bankr. D. Del. filed Oct. 15, 2006). 
 28. Exide Technologies, About Exide Technologies, http://www.exide.com/ 
about_exide.html (last visited May 20, 2007). 
 29. Exide Corp., Form 10-K (Annual Report), at 2 (June 29, 2001), available at 
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/XIDE/126418007x0xS1045969-01-500609/8137 
81/filing.pdf.  
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ica, and three percent in the Asia Pacific region.30 Exide at that time em-
ployed approximately 20,000 people. While 8,400 of them were in North 
America, more were employed in Europe.31 The company owned real 
estate in the United States, Australia, England, France, Germany, Italy, 
New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, and Spain.32 Its largest single facility 
was a five million square-foot manufacturing plant in Italy.33 
After the turn of the century, Exide found itself heavily indebted. The 
debt had been incurred as part of its expansion into the Asia Pacific re-
gion.34 Despite its global reach, Exide resolved its financial distress in a 
single insolvency proceeding, which, as with Sea Containers, was a 
Chapter 11 case filed in Delaware.35 
What allowed these three companies to avoid the ills posited by the 
universalists? In each case there was a debtor with substantial assets in 
numerous countries. Creditors of each company could be found in vari-
ous jurisdictions as well. Yet in all cases there was only a single insol-
vency proceeding. There were no competing courts or cooperating 
courts; there was only a single court where the affairs of each debtor 
were hammered out. 
Part of the explanation lies in corporate structure. Each of these com-
panies, as is the case with the vast majority of large, publicly held com-
panies, was not housed within a single legal entity. Rather, each was a 
corporate group. For example, when United Airlines filed for bankruptcy 
in Chicago, there were in fact twenty-eight separate bankruptcy petitions 
filed.36 One was by the parent company and twenty-seven were by its 
subsidiaries. The cases were procedurally consolidated into a single pro-
ceeding.37 
The twenty-eight companies owed the bulk of United’s debt and 
owned the majority of the enterprise’s assets. To be sure, United had two 
foreign subsidiaries: Four Star Insurance Company and Kion de Mexico. 
United decided not to put either of its two foreign subsidiaries into insol-
vency proceedings. They continued to run their operations in the ordi-
                                                                                                             
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 14.  
 32. Id. at 16. 
 33. Exide Technologies, Form 10-K (Annual Report), at 17 (Aug. 19, 2002) [herein-
after Exide Corp., Annual Report 2002], available at http://files.shareholder.com/ 
downloads/XIDE/126418007x0xS950109-02-4366/813781/filing.pdf. 
 34. See id. at 2. 
 35. Id. 
 36. In re UAL Corp., Nos. 02-48191–02-48218 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. filed Dec. 9, 2002). 
 37. In re UAL Corp., No. 02-B-48191 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Dec. 11, 2002) (order direct-
ing joint administration of cases), available at http://www.pd-ual.com/Downloads/ 
UAL%20Joint%20Administration%20Order.pdf. 
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nary course of business, and they remain subsidiaries of the new, reor-
ganized United. 
Yet corporate structure is only part of the story. Corporate structure al-
lows the debtor to pick and choose which entities file for bankruptcy. Yet 
the debtor also needs a mechanism to ensure that the entities that it does 
not put into bankruptcy are not forced into bankruptcy by unpaid credi-
tors. What we observe here is creative financing designed to ensure that 
the foreign operations remain outside of insolvency proceedings. Con-
sider in this regard the Exide bankruptcy. Exide and four of its domestic 
subsidiaries filed for bankruptcy in Delaware.38 Exide’s foreign lenders, 
who were owed money by Exide’s foreign subsidiaries, agreed to a 
standstill, and the bankruptcy case proceeded in this country. To be sure, 
the foreign subsidiaries may have needed access to capital. Yet this was 
accommodated within the American Debtor-in-Possession (DIP) financ-
ing package. The DIP loan included a $65 million sub-facility that Exide 
could draw upon to lend to its foreign subsidiaries. So long as the lenders 
of the foreign subsidiaries adhered to the standstill and the trade creditors 
were paid in the ordinary course of business, Exide could address its fi-
nancial distress in a single forum. In the end, after two years in bank-
ruptcy, Exide emerged from Chapter 11 as a Dutch company. 
In addition to corporate structure and financing, the goals which those 
in control of the companies sought to achieve played a large role. To il-
lustrate this point, consider Sea Containers. The company in the 1980s 
and 1990s had diversified it operations. It began as a marine container 
leasing company in 1965, and it eventually sought to expand beyond its 
core business. Perhaps most notably, it bought the Hotel Cipriani in Ven-
ice and the Venice Simplon-Orient Express tourist train.39 Early this dec-
ade, however, the company decided that it needed to focus on its core 
business. It sold many of its discrete businesses, leaving the company 
with its railway and sea container operations as its primary lines of busi-
ness. Indeed, in 2006 it even sought a buyer for the railroad. 
Despite the sale of its assets, Sea Containers could not service its debt. 
The company, however, had already decided on what business strategy to 
pursue; it wanted to shed all of its extraneous business and focus on its 
container operations. All it needed to do was to adjust its debts so that its 
obligations would be in line with its revenues. Accordingly, Sea Con-
tainers began discussions with an ad-hoc committee of noteholders. The 
                                                                                                             
 38. Exide Technologies, Annual Report 2002, supra note 33, at 2. 
 39. News Release, Orient Express Hotels Trains & Cruises, Company Profile (July 
2006), at 2, available at http://www.oeh.com/binaries/Company%20Profile%2017.10.06 
_tcm4-76330.pdf. 
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company had issued four series of notes, one of these was to mature in 
October 2006. The company had hoped to reach agreement on a consen-
sual restructuring of the public debt without the need for an insolvency 
proceeding, but it could not find common ground with its noteholders 
before the principal payment became due. 
To forestall default on the public notes, Sea Containers had an Ameri-
can subsidiary file a petition for bankruptcy under Chapter 11. Immedi-
ately thereafter, the parent company, which is chartered in Bermuda, and 
another subsidiary, this one chartered in the United Kingdom, also filed 
for bankruptcy under Chapter 11.40 As all of the notes had been issued by 
the parent company, the filing prevented the holders of the notes from 
taking any collection action.41 Neither the parent nor the two subsidiaries 
contained any of the operating assets of the company. Both the railroad 
and the sea container business continued to operate and pay their debts in 
the ordinary course. 
Not only can we readily find cases in which the debtor can structure its 
bankruptcy proceedings such that it does not encounter multiple forums, 
but we can also find situations in which debtors themselves invoke the 
multiple forums as part of their strategy for addressing the problems that 
they face. One example of this is the Enron bankruptcy. Enron filed a 
bankruptcy proceeding in the United States, but it also filed insolvency 
proceedings in England, Canada, Japan, and Thailand. The assets owned 
by Enron were indeed liquidated, but this was not the inefficient liquida-
tion that is the stuff of universalists’ nightmares. With Enron, the causal 
arrow ran in the other direction. It was not that the multiple proceedings 
led to Enron’s liquidation. Rather, it was the decision to liquidate En-
ron’s assets that led to the multiple proceedings. Enron had engaged in 
aggressive expansion overseas. These assets, by and large, were dedi-
cated assets such as power plants, dams and water facilities. There was 
little reason to believe that these assets should be kept together in a sin-
                                                                                                             
 40. The use of a subsidiary to establish venue in a chosen court is a common practice 
in American bankruptcy litigation. Perhaps the most notable use of this maneuver was 
when Eastern Airlines established venue in the Southern District of New York by placing 
the subsidiary that ran Eastern’s hospitality suites for its frequent fliers into bankruptcy 
there, even though this subsidiary was solvent. Six minutes later, the parent company 
filed in the same district, basing venue on the fact that an affiliate already had a case 
pending in that court. Robert K. Rasmussen & Randall S. Thomas, Timing Matters: Pro-
moting Forum Shopping by Insolvent Corporations, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1357, 1365 
(2000). 
 41. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2006). 
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gle enterprise. Rather, they needed to be sold to the highest bidder.42 
Here, local insolvency proceedings provided a convenient vehicle to dis-
pose of these businesses. Sales conducted by the local bankruptcy courts 
assured the buyers that they would get clean title to the purchased assets. 
The ongoing Calpine bankruptcy is yet another example of the debtor 
deciding to open multiple proceedings. Calpine is a large energy pro-
ducer with assets in the United States, Canada, and Mexico.43 Calpine 
had grown aggressively through acquisitions which it financed with debt. 
When Calpine sought bankruptcy protection, its attorneys made a deci-
sion to file cases in both the United States and Canada, but not in other 
jurisdictions where it owned assets. Moreover, only some of Calpine’s 
subsidiaries in these countries filed for bankruptcy. The reason for this 
decision was that the attorneys concluded that the two-case strategy of-
fered more flexibility than if Calpine had proceeded in the United States 
alone, and that only certain of the subsidiaries needed to address their 
problems as part of an insolvency proceeding. 
The care that goes into deciding how many proceedings are opened and 
for what purpose highlights a distinction between transnational insolven-
cies and domestic insolvencies that is too often overlooked. Two decades 
ago, Thomas Jackson justified American bankruptcy law as solving a 
collective action problem.44 Left to their own devices, creditors would 
pursue their state law collection remedies. This dogged pursuit of their 
narrow interests would lead to an inefficient piecemeal liquidation of the 
business. 
The analogy does not translate perfectly to the international setting. As 
mentioned above, transnational businesses, by and large, are structured 
as corporate groups. The assets of the business within one country tend 
to be owned by a domestic corporation in that country, with the stock of 
that company owned by a foreign parent. When a creditor seeks to real-
ize on its assets, it sues the domestic corporation. Each country, however, 
has a system designed to deal with the financial distress of its domestic 
entities. By and large, these systems prevent a destructive piecemeal liq-
uidation of the domestic entity. Thus, national insolvency laws simply do 
not suffer from the lack of coordination evinced by the state law debt 
collection system. 
                                                                                                             
 42. On the lack of going concern in Enron and the controlled sale of all of its assets, 
see Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The Four (or Five) Easy Lessons of En-
ron, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1787 (2002). 
 43. In re Calpine Corp., 2007 WL 685595, at *2–3 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2007) 
(order regarding replacement post-petition financing, objection to claims, and value of 
secured claims). 
 44. See THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW (1986). 
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This does not imply that Chapter 15, the UNCITRAL Model Law, or 
the E.U. Insolvency Regulation is necessarily a poor or misguided idea. 
Each may provide a useful default rule, especially in those cases where a 
transnational company becomes financially distressed very quickly, and 
those in control do not have a chance to decide on the best course of ac-
tion prior to filing for bankruptcy. Yet when debtors are not in a “free 
fall” situation, the coordination mandated by these laws may not matter 
all that much. In many instances transnational defaults can be handled in 
a single case. In other situations, debtors can use corporate structure to 
decide precisely how many proceedings will be opened and in which 
countries. Corporate structure and creative financing allow bankruptcy 
lawyers several degrees of freedom when planning a case. 
To be sure, there is not infinite flexibility in this regard. One could 
imagine a world in which capital structure decisions are designed to en-
sure that the threat of inefficient multiple proceedings are eliminated at 
the lending stage. For example, assume that the debtor and its lenders 
decide that American law provides the framework under which they 
would want to work out any future financial distress. Assume also that, 
prior to the execution of the loan, the debtor had no relationship at all 
with the United States. It would be relatively easy to form an American 
company, have the loan made to that company, and have other members 
of the corporate group guarantee the obligations. The new American 
company would then distribute the borrowed funds to the operation com-
panies on an as-needed basis. All new borrowing activity would be un-
dertaken by the American company. This action would place all of the 
debt in the American subsidiary. If financial distress were to arise, the 
American subsidiary could file for bankruptcy under American law. 
Such a “bankruptcy-centric” view of capital structure, however, runs 
aground on reality. There are numerous forces that affect a company’s 
capital structure to a vastly greater degree than does the possibility of a 
future bankruptcy proceeding. Tax law, for example, imposes severe lim-
its on freedom in this regard. Imagine a typical case in which the parent 
company is an American holding company, its main operating subsidiary 
is also an American company, and it also has two foreign subsidiaries. 
The simple structure of a loan to the American parent with guarantees by 
all of the subsidiaries is not a realistic probability. This is due to the ef-
fect of section 959 of the U.S. Tax Code—the so-called “deemed divi-
dend” provision.45 The net effect of this provision is that if the foreign 
subsidiaries were to guarantee the loan to the American parent, this 
would subject all of the income of the foreign subsidiary to United States 
                                                                                                             
 45. 26 U.S.C. § 959 (2006). 
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income tax. The same result would occur if the American parent were to 
pledge more than two-thirds of the stock of the foreign subsidiary to back 
up the loan. The economic effect of subjecting the foreign subsidiaries’ 
income to United States tax exceeds any benefit gained in having an op-
timal structure in place to deal with any future financial distress.46 
While tax law thus limits the freedom of lenders to structure their 
transactions, there are still ways that lenders can limit the possibility of 
conflicting bankruptcy proceedings at the lending stage. For example, if 
the foreign subsidiaries are not contributing much to the overall asset 
package, the lender may be content to have the foreign subsidiaries enter 
into negative covenants limiting the amount of debt that the foreign sub-
sidiaries can incur. Such a limitation would have two effects. The first is 
to preserve value for the lender, in that the lender has a direct claim 
against the parent and also can get a lien on up to two-thirds of the for-
eign subsidiaries’ stock. This would provide the lender with a first posi-
tion on the equity of the foreign subsidiary. Second, by limiting the 
amount of debt in a foreign subsidiary, the lender limits the risk that that 
subsidiary would be insolvent and the risk of being thrown into a foreign 
insolvency proceeding over the parent’s objection. 
Of course, a potential future bankruptcy proceeding is far from the 
only, or even most important, factor when a debtor plans its capital struc-
ture. It may have economic reasons to put debt into the foreign subsidi-
ary. Debt is a tax shield, and the value of that shield may be more to the 
foreign subsidiary than it is to the parent. Also, there may be substantial 
value in the assets of the foreign subsidiary that the debtor would like to 
borrow against, but an American lender would hesitate to lend because it 
cannot lock up the assets.  
Yet another factor driving capital structure is convenience. Businesses 
often need access to banking services on a constant basis. Operating 
companies issue commercial letters of credit, send wire transfers, and 
deposit funds on a daily basis. It is often cheaper to buy these services 
from a local bank that finances the company’s working capital needs. 
Forcing all of these relationships to a foreign bank in order to control the 
location of any future bankruptcy proceeding would make little sense. 
When there are reasons for having a subsidiary incur debt, one pattern 
that we see is to have each local subsidiary establish its own line of credit 
with a local bank. This local borrowing creates a tax shield for the for-
eign subsidiary. Additionally, it allows the enterprise to borrow against 
                                                                                                             
 46. Of course, as is seen in Sea Containers, one can place the parent company in 
Bermuda. So long as there is one member of the corporate group in the United States, 
Chapter 11 will be an option. 
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the foreign assets. It also creates a relationship with a local bank that can 
provide needed services. While incurring debt at the subsidiary level cre-
ates the risk of multiple insolvency proceedings because the enterprise 
now has multiple creditors chasing assets in various jurisdictions, plan-
ning on the eve of bankruptcy can alleviate the threat. One potential tac-
tic is to get a standstill agreement as in Exide. Under such an understand-
ing, the lenders agree not to enforce their loans against the foreign as-
sets.47 Indeed, standstill agreements are a common practice. For example, 
John Armour and Simon Deakin have documented how the so-called 
“London Approach” to corporate restructuring rests on standstill agree-
ments.48 In its traditional form, the London Approach was the U.K. 
method for resolving the financial distress of large corporations. By and 
large, the debt of these corporations was held by London Banks. When 
the borrowers encountered financial distress, the lenders would agree to a 
standstill. Under a standstill, all of the banks agree not to collect on out-
standing loans. They would then restructure the business outside of for-
mal insolvency proceedings. To the extent that the American parent can 
assuage the fears of the foreign lenders, these lenders can execute a 
standstill and proceed under Chapter 11. 
Even when the foreign lenders get nervous and call their lines of credit, 
adroit action on the part of the debtor’s professionals can prevent a for-
eign proceeding. For example, it is possible to get takeout financing in 
the DIP loan. In such a loan, the debtor borrows a sufficient amount to 
both fund its needs for the reorganization effort and to pay off the foreign 
lender. Such action ensures that the foreign lender cannot open up a new 
insolvency proceeding and create the threat of multiple proceedings. 
Current bankruptcy practice thus does not leave one overly concerned 
with the thought that failure to adopt a purely universalist regime has led 
to great inefficiencies of the type that motivates the universalist project. 
This does not mean that there is no cause for concern. Debtors have some 
degree of control over where their affairs will be handled. The question 
which the transnational insolvency literature has to address is whether 
this discretion will be used in a socially satisfactory manner. 
                                                                                                             
 47. In Sea Containers, the private lenders had a security interest in basically all of the 
assets of the company. Although the company was in default under both of its two main 
credit facilities, neither lending group sought to place the debtor in insolvency. The aim 
of the United States Chapter 11 case is simply to restructure the public debt, which is 
junior to the secured debt. 
 48. See John Armour & Simon Deakin, Norms in Private Insolvency: The “London 
Approach” to the Resolution of Financial Distress, 1 J. CORP. L. STUD. 21 (2001). 
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III. CREDITOR CONTROL AND TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCIES 
Transnational insolvency practice has developed the ability to avoid 
some of the more dire expectations of scholars. To be sure, there are un-
doubtedly cases in which the unexpected happens and the debtor finds 
itself thrust into bankruptcy proceedings with little opportunity for ad-
vance planning. The risk of uncoordinated proceedings may have been 
reduced, but not eliminated. So called “free falls” will still occur. Yet 
such cases may well become a residual category. For an increasing num-
ber of financially distressed companies, which country or countries han-
dles the reorganization effort will be the result of conscious planning on 
the part of the debtor and its senior creditors. This development opens up 
new areas of scholarly inquiry. Much of the academic attention in the 
transnational insolvency literature has been focused on which actions 
countries should take to mitigate the problems caused by local creditors 
triggering competing proceedings around the globe. The more pressing 
issue today is to understand the implications of modern transnational re-
organization practice. 
For example, one overlooked policy question that needs to be ad-
dressed is the extent to which debtors should retain the freedom they 
have in restructuring their affairs. As recounted above, debtors today of-
ten choose which country is going to be the venue of the main reorgani-
zation effort and the extent to which the courts of other countries will be 
involved. The welfare effects of this practice have yet to be considered 
by either scholars or policymakers. To do this, one first has to assess the 
factors that drive a debtor’s decisions as it slides into bankruptcy. The 
bankruptcy practice of today looks fundamentally different from the 
practice of two decades ago. At that time, it was common to view Chap-
ter 11 as a haven for the very managers that were responsible for leading 
the company into financial distress. Many European practitioners viewed 
such a system with disbelief. Today, however, Chapter 11 has been trans-
formed. Managers often are replaced even before the case is filed. More-
over, the new CEOs tend to be cut from a different cloth: they often are 
professionals who specialize in turnaround work, do not plan to remain 
with the company for a long time, and their prospects for future em-
ployment depend on how well they maximize the returns to the com-
pany’s investors, primarily its private debt holders.49 
Even in cases in which old managers stay in place, they are not im-
mune from the actions of creditors. The lenders providing the financing 
for the bankruptcy case can exert enormous influence on whether the 
                                                                                                             
 49. See Baird & Rasmussen, Private Debt, supra note 10, at 1235. 
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debtor is restructured or its assets sold to the highest bidder.50 Sophisti-
cated lenders are going to keep managers on a short leash. Jamie 
Sprayregen, perhaps the most prominent attorney representing debtors in 
Chapter 11 cases before he joined Goldman Sachs last year, has opined 
that “the central purpose of the restructuring market . . . is to serve as the 
means by which the economy recycles assets and maximizes value, 
thereby maximizing creditor recoveries.”51 
There is a vibrant and deepening literature that explores the control that 
creditors can exert in the domestic context.52 One can find tentative sup-
port for the new practices as well as opposition to them. This literature to 
date has focused primarily on the American market. While a plausible 
working assumption may be that the trends one finds in America extend 
to transnational insolvencies worldwide, this is merely an assumption. 
More work exploring the dynamics of transnational insolvencies needs to 
be done. 
A difficulty in attempting to evaluate practice in this area, both domes-
tically and internationally, is that bankruptcy practice is by no means 
static.53 Two examples illustrate the point. The first is the rise of second 
liens. A second lien is created when the lender takes a security interest in 
the assets of the debtor, even though all of these assets have been 
pledged to a prior lending group. Second liens have begun to replace tra-
ditional mezzanine financing for a substantial number of companies.54 A 
loan accompanied by a second lien has the same priority of payment as 
the first loan. In this crucial respect, it is not a traditional subordination 
                                                                                                             
 50. These lenders may come onto the scene when bankruptcy is filed through a 
debtor-in-possession financing package. This financing may be done in large part by 
those who hold substantial portions of the company’s existing secured debt. Alterna-
tively, the financing may come through the use of cash collateral. In such a situation, the 
debtor will be solicitous of the concerns of its existing secured lending syndicate. 
 51. James H.M. Sprayregen et al., Chapter 11: Not Perfect, But Better than the Alter-
natives, 14 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 6, art. 1 (2005). 
 52. See Lubben, The “New and Improved” Chapter 11, supra note 10; George W. 
Kuney, Hijacking Chapter 11, 21 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J., 19 (2004); Westbrook, The 
Control of Wealth in Bankruptcy, supra note 10; Baird & Rasmussen, Private Debt, su-
pra note 10; Baird & Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight, supra note 10; Harvey R. 
Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, The Creditor in Posession: Creditor Control of Chapter 11 
Reorganization Cases, 21 BANKR. STRATEGIST 1 (2003); Skeel, Creditors’ Ball, supra 
note 10; Baird & Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, supra note 10; Barry Adler et al., 
Bankruptcy Initiation in the New Era of Chapter 11 (working paper). 
 53. Douglas Baird and I explore these ongoing changes in Douglas G. Baird & Robert 
K. Rasmussen, Common Pools, Common Disasters, and the Anticommons: Hedge Funds 
in Modern Reorganization Law, (working paper) [hereinafter Baird & Rasmussen, Hedge 
Funds in Bankruptcy Law]. 
 54. On second liens, see Baird & Rasmussen, Private Debt, supra note 10, at 1247. 
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agreement under which the subordinated party does not receive a payout 
until the superior party is paid in full. The rights of payment of both first-
lien holders and second-lien holders enjoy the same priority. However, 
second liens have a second position as to collateral backing the loans. 
Those holding a second lien cannot seize their collateral and realize on it 
ahead of the first-lien holder. 
The crucial document in a second-loan transaction is the inter-creditor 
agreement, which specifies the relationship between the first lender and 
the second. Bankruptcy is one of the issues over which the parties nego-
tiate at the time that the second-lien financing is being put in place. One 
typical provision allows the second-lien holder the option to buy out the 
position of the senior lender. One possibility given the dynamic of the 
market is that we may see lenders owning both the first and second 
liens.55 
The effects of second-lien financing on domestic reorganization prac-
tice have yet to be fully felt. Second-lien financing arose at a time of qui-
escent bankruptcy activity. The combination of low interest rates and 
abundant liquidity has meant that relatively few companies have filed for 
Chapter 11 relief in the past two years. Indeed, 2006 saw the least num-
ber of large, publicly held companies filing for bankruptcy since 1984.56 
One thing appears clear: given the way that the amount that the second-
lien lenders lend to the debtor is determined, it is unlikely that that there 
will be any value left for unsecured creditors when the company files. 
Second-lien lenders tend to value the company on an enterprise basis, 
and lend close to such value. When the value of the business declines, 
the money owed to the first- and second- lien holders will exceed the 
value of the company. Thus, we can expect to see bankruptcies in which 
the only groups in the money are the first- and second-lien holders. 
While silent lines are often no longer completely “silent,” it is usually 
the case that the inter-creditor agreement provides that the second-lien 
holder automatically consents to a cash collateral order to which the first-
lien holder has consented. This provision provides a great deal of discre-
tion to the first-lien holder in crafting the bankruptcy financing package. 
Moreover, the second-lien market differs between Europe and the United 
States. In the United States, the assumption is that Chapter 11 will be 
                                                                                                             
 55. Steven S. Kerr & Joanna Rovito, Second-Lien Evolution Creates Higher Recovery 
Prospects—At First-Lien Lenders’ Expense, in STANDARD & POORS, A GUIDE TO  
THE LOAN MARKET 46, 48 (2005), available at http://www2.standardandpoors.com 
/spf/pdf/fixedincome/loan_market_2005_pg46-54.pdf. 
 56. See News Release, Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Bankruptcy Filings Decline 
in FY 2006 (Dec. 5, 2006), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Press_Releases/ 
bankruptcyfilings120506.html. 
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used. The inter-creditor agreement dictates the extent to which the senior 
lien holder gets to “drive the bus.” Oftentimes, the second-lien holder 
will agree not to contest certain aspects of the proceeding. In Europe, 
which has a greater tradition of out-of-court restructurings than exists in 
the United States, the inter-creditor agreement devotes efforts towards 
standstill agreements. These agreements have the effect of buying time 
for the company to restructure its operations. The rise of second liens and 
the continued development of inter-creditor agreements provide a new 
mechanism to ward off the evils chronicled by those espousing the uni-
versalist position. 
A second development which is altering both domestic and interna-
tional bankruptcy practice is the rise of hedge funds.57 The standard op-
erating assumption of American bankruptcy law is that it is, by and large, 
a forum for parties who do not want to be there. The debtor and its credi-
tors entered their relationships with hope for the best, but the worst mate-
rialized. The banks, the management, the public lenders, and the trade 
creditors had to make the best of a bad situation. Bankruptcy placed them 
in a collective forum where they would chart a new course of action. 
Hedge funds have rendered this conception obsolete. Those creditors 
who want no part of bankruptcy have an exit option: they can sell out to 
the various hedge funds that take a stake in many cases. Some hedge 
funds seek to profit solely based on their informational advantage and the 
desire of creditors for liquidity. They will purchase the claims of trade 
creditors, buy up public bonds, and purchase loans on the secondary 
market. These funds make their profit on the basis of paying less for the 
claims than they will ultimately be settled for at the end of the day. 
Other hedge funds, however, play the loan-to-own game. They view 
bankruptcy as a potential vehicle for an acquisition. They acquire claims 
with the expectation that they will be long-term investors in the com-
pany.58 For example, Ed Lempert and his hedge fund, ESL, bought 
Kmart while the company was in Chapter 11.59 
These financial developments do not end at the oceans’ shores. Hedge 
funds prowl the world looking for opportunities to invest their bugling 
war chests. Indeed, hedge funds are a major source of second liens, both 
in America and in Europe. They are already playing major roles in nota-
ble bankruptcies. For example, in the ongoing Delphi bankruptcy, the 
                                                                                                             
 57. See Baird & Rasmussen, Hedge Funds in Bankruptcy, supra note 53. 
 58. For a description of this activity, see David A. Skeel, Jr., The Past, Present and 
Future of Debtor-in-Possession Financing, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1905, 1929–32 (2004). 
 59. While Kmart is primarily an American company, it does have foreign subsidiar-
ies. None of these foreign subsidiaries were subject to insolvency proceedings. 
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current plan is to restructure the company using a $3.4 billion infusion by 
a consortium of hedge funds.60 The managers of Delphi chose this pack-
age over another one offered by a competing group of hedge funds.61 
Hedge funds have the effect of increasing the concentration of claims. 
With the existence of hedge funds, there are fewer dispersed investors. 
Indeed, to the extent one concludes that these developments increase the 
likelihood that a company’s assets are deployed to their highest-valued 
use, this would suggest a different policy prescription than the one of-
fered by the universalists. Rather than nudging countries to coordinate 
their laws, those involved with transnational insolvencies should push 
countries to facilitate the claims-trading market. The fewer the partici-
pants, the more likely it is that they will be able to reach an agreement on 
how best to deploy the company’s assets. With fewer players in the 
game, it may become even easier for debtors to limit themselves to a sin-
gle forum and only use a second forum when those in control decide that 
such action will increase value. 
To the extent that one views the changing state of affairs positively, fu-
ture reforms should attempt to harness the power of the creditors. We do 
not need coordination among bankruptcy courts; what we need is coordi-
nation among lenders. Devices such as second liens and entities such as 
hedge funds may serve to increase such coordination. 
On this vision, efforts by lawmakers to decide ex ante which is the 
“correct” forum for transnational insolvencies seem misguided. Allowing 
those with their hands on the levers of control to select the bankruptcy 
forum may well increase value. A single American proceeding to reor-
ganize Exide and multiple proceedings to sell Enron may have been the 
correct decision. It is difficult to imagine a set of binding rules that 
would have allowed both Enron and Exide to accomplish what each 
company needed. 
On the other hand, the increasing complexity of the interests that are 
held by hedge funds may make it more difficult to reach consensus on 
what should happen to the debtor. Should this happen, the changes that 
we are witnessing do not enhance value but dissipate it. For example, it 
takes little to imagine a hedge fund threatening to launch a value-
destroying second proceeding in order to force payment on its claims. 
Indeed, there have already been situations in the sovereign debt markets 
in which a hedge fund aggressively pursued its legal rights to increase its 
return even though such action had the effect of impairing restructuring 
                                                                                                             
 60. Nick Bunkley, Parts Firms Drawing Investors; Operations Tilted Away from 
Detroit Toward World Market, INT’L HERALD TRIBUNE, Feb. 1, 2007, at 12. 
 61. Id. 
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efforts. Along these lines, hedge fund activity seems to be at odds with 
the clubby nature of the London Approach. 
Of course, the market may adjust to these threats. In the medium run, 
more money is made by finding solutions that maximize value rather 
than by strategies that simply transfer value. Still, as we go forward in 
thinking about transnational insolvency law, this is the type of risk that 
we should be worried about. We should not make it easier for a recalci-
trant creditor to initiate an insolvency proceeding. Indeed, given the in-
creasing concentration of debt claims, we could imagine fairly high trig-
gers designed to protect against opportunistic behavior. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Ten years ago, transnational insolvency law seemed to be a growth in-
dustry. Worldwide economic growth and the lowering of transaction 
costs promised to create more companies whose reach exceeded national 
boarders. Such growth in transnational business would lead to growth in 
transnational insolvency. We have indeed seen the growth in business, 
but we have yet to see the accompanying explosion in transnational in-
solvency. This does not mean that transnational companies do not file for 
bankruptcy—they do. However, the fear of uncoordinated proceedings 
running up costs and liquidating viable companies has not become real-
ity. By and large, it may be the case that the ills so apparent to academics 
were apparent to practitioners and their clients as well. Ultimately, mar-
kets reward those who can find value. 
The challenge for the next generation of transnational insolvency 
scholarship is threefold. The first part is to understand current practices. 
The number of bankruptcy cases involving multiple proceedings is far 
less than the number of cases involving debtors with foreign subsidiaries. 
We need to better appreciate this dynamic. We lack comprehensive data 
on how many transnational enterprises resolve their financial distress in a 
single insolvency proceeding. The second part is to assess the welfare 
effects of this practice. American bankruptcy law has come to be charac-
terized by creditor control. Given the fluidity of capital markets, it should 
come as no surprise to see this same pattern played out with transnational 
companies. Finally, the third part is to reevaluate our efforts. To the ex-
tent that we applaud or condemn the current trend, there is little to sug-
gest that bankruptcy laws can halt its development. Rather, our reform 
efforts have to take shape against the backdrop of this practice. In doing 
so, we need to reorient our focus. Rather than focus on countries and the 
extent to which they cooperate, we need to focus on the market players 
who are creating modern transnational insolvency practice. 
